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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The jurisdiction of this court is based upon U.C.A. § 78-2-2 (4): The Supreme Court may
transfer to the Court of Appeals any of the matters over which the Supreme Court has original
appellate jurisdiction.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
Did the trial court err by holding that the Plaintiffs battery claims were barred by the
statute of limitations, and that plaintiff failed to allege sufficient facts to support her other claims
when viewed in the light most favorable to her?
STANDARD OF REVIEW
On review of a grant of summary judgment or a motion on the pleadings treated as a motion
for summary judgment under Rule 12, the party against whom the judgment has been granted is
entitled to have all the facts presented and all the inferences fairly arising therefrom considered in a
light most favorable to him. Morris v. Farnsworth Motel 123 Utah 289 259 P.2d 297 (1953)
Moreover, the appellate court reviews conclusions of law for correctness without according
deference to the trial court's legal conclusions. Bonham v. Morgan 788 P.2d 497 (Utah 1989).

AUTHORITIES OF CENTRAL IMPORTANCE
Plaintiff is unaware of any Utah case that addresses the standard to which attorneys are
held in the context of sexual relationships with their clients. However, plaintiff relies on
4

Kilpatrick v. Wiley, 909 P.2d 1283, 1289 (Utah App. 1996), for support for her claims of breach
of fiduciary duty as well as her analysis of causation under several different theories. This case is
also instructive on the standard attorneys should generally be held to in their dealing with their
clients. Plaintiff also relies on cases from other jurisdictions for the proposition that attorneys
who engage in sexual relations with their clients should he held liable for intentional infliction of
emotional distress. These authorities include McDaniel v. Gile, 230 Cal. App. 3d 363,281 Cal.
Rptr. 242 (Cal.App.Dist.2 05/21/1991) and Maria Del Rosario Vallino v. Edmond A. DiSandro
etal.RI.35 (1997).

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Plaintiff retained Defendant, an attorney, to represent her in a divorce matter. It is
undisputed that a romantic and sexual relationship arose as a result of this representation,
although the question of when the relationship commenced is disputed by the parties. Plaintiff
alleges that Defendant took advantage of the attorney client relationship to obtain sexual favors
from the plaintiff and that he committed fraud and breached his fiduciary duty to the plaintiff in
using client confidences to coerce the Plaintiff into engaging in a sexual relationship with him.
Plaintiff alleges that as a result of these actions, she has suffered severe emotional harm.
Plaintiff filed her complaint against defendant on February 2,2001. Defendant filed a motion to
dismiss and an affidavit and requested that the court convert Defendant's Motion to Dismiss to a
Motion for Summary Judgment. The Trial Court, Honorable Stephen L. Henriod presiding,
granted Defendant's Motion to Convert. Oral argument on Defendant's Motion for Summary
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Judgment was held on September 11, 2001, and a minute entry granting Defendant's Motion was
entered on October 4, 2001.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
L

From June, 1998 through October, 2000, Walter was a client of Attorney Stewart.

2.

From June, 1998 through April, 1999, Stewart represented Walter in a divorce action.

3.

During the years noted above, from 1998 through 2000, Stewart was a member of the Utah

State Bar, and a practicing attorney within the State of Utah.
4.

Throughout the years specified, Stewart used means available to him as a lawyer and

confidant to establish intimate sexual contact with Walter under false pretenses and fraudulent
misrepresentation.
5.

From June, 1998 through October, 2000, Stewart sexually preyed upon and sexually abused

and harassed Walter.
6.

From 1998 through 2000, Stewart used his position, authority, status, influence, and power as

a lawyer to sexually pursue, harass, subdue, dominate, abuse, and take advantage of Walter.
7.

From 1998 through 2000, Stewart engaged in the following conduct towards Walter and

perpetrated the following acts upon Walter: continual misrepresentation regarding his marital status,
pressuring for sexual favors and promises to marry Plaintiff. Use of his superiority in position,
experience and attorney, as described in paragraphs 18 and 19 above to wrongfully induce Walter to
participate in sexual activities.
8.

In 1999, the inappropriate sexual behavior inflicted by Stewart upon Walter as described

above, wasfrequent,at times daily. Walter relied upon Stewart's representations, and would never
6

have engaged in a sexual relationship had she known the truth.
9.

In 1999, the sexual behavior inflicted by Stewart upon Walter as described above, arose as a

result of, and during the course of, and by means of, the membership of Stewart as a member of the
Utah State Bar and his positions of trust as Walter's attorney. Much of this inappropriate sexual
behavior occurred in the apartment of Plaintiff, during a period of time Plaintiff was especially
vulnerable as a result of her divorce and her emotional dependency upon her attorney who was her
agent in that procedure.
10.

Stewart allowed his sexual relationship with Walter to affect his representation of her to

Walter's detriment. Stewart advised Walter that she should not pay money she owed to her husband
as part of the property settlement in her divorce action, because she would be able to avoid the debt
by moving to Maryland. Stewart then failed to notify Walter that her divorce was finalized and that
she was free to move to Maryland as she desired. Instead, he delayed informing Walter of her
divorce in order to continue his sexual advances against Walter as alleged above.
11.

Stewart accepted sexual favors as tacit payment for his services. Stewart represented Walter

in a show cause hearing because she had not paid her husband based on Stewart's advice. Stewart
did not bill Walter for his services in representing her but did press her for sex. After successfully
representing Walter in a name change action, Stewart grabbed Walter around the waist and asked
Walter to have sex with him.
12.

Stewart allowed his sexual relationship with Walter to cloud his professional judgment.

Stewart advised Walter she could change her name during her divorce proceeding. Walter later
learned that this name change had delayed Plaintiffs international adoption case and would require
7

an additional court appearance. Stewart allowed his sexual relationship with his client to cloud his
judgment. As a result of these actions Walter incurred additional expense and frustration in
processing her international adoption. She also suffered emotional harm as a result of Stewart's
actions.
13.

Walter confided intimate details of her marriage and divorce and of her emotional state to

Stewart. Stewart was aware that Walter was emotionallyfragileand insecure.
14.

Stewart deceived Walter as to his actual marital status. Had Walter known the truth

regarding the marital status of Stewart, she would never have consented to any form of intimate
contact whatever.
15.

Stewart was aware that his sexual relationship, his sexual manipulation and his

misrepresentations to Walter about his marital status would cause Plaintiff severe emotional harm.
16.

In 1999 and as a result of the sexual abuse described above, Walter was traumatized,

disoriented, isolated, felt abandoned, felt helpless, felt worthless, frightened, depressed, and
paralyzed. More and more she found herself to be in the grip and power of Stewart.
17.

From 1998 through 2000, by a combination of means, including fraud, power, coercion,

intimidation, shaming, cajolery, trust, confidentiality, and false representations, Stewart induced
Walter to engage in sexual intercourse and to remain silent respecting the sexual activities of Stewart
and Walter.
18.

In 2000, and as a result of the sexual abuse described above, Walter became mentally

distraught. She suffered enormous psychic pain. She became incapacitated emotionally to a nearly
irreversible extent. She required psychological treatment as a direct result of Stewart's action.
8

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Under either a motion to dismiss standard or a summary judgment standard the Plaintiffs
allegations in her complaint and affidavit, viewed in the light most favorable to her, support
several causes of action against the Defendant. There are several material issues of fact in
dispute which, if proved, would allow a jury to find in the Plaintiffs favor. Thus, the decision of
the trial court should be reversed and plaintiff should be allowed to submit her evidence to a jury.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN ALLOWING THE
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS TO BE CONVERTED INTO A MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT.

Rule 12 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
If, on a motion asserting the defense numbered (6) to dismiss for failure of the pleading to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted, matters outside the pleading are presented to and
not excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed
of as provided in Rule 56, and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all
material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56. URCP 12 (b) (7).
It is generally not well advised to treat a motion to dismiss as one for summary judgment.
Salt Lake County v. Salt Lake City, 570 P.2d 119 (Utah 1977). The rationale for this is obvious:
until the parties have had the opportunity to conduct discovery, a claimant may be prejudiced by
having to assert facts s/he has not yet had a chance to evaluate or even discover. Under
defendant's reading of the statute, any motion to dismiss can be converted to a motion for
summary judgment and circumvent the discovery process merely by having the defendant submit
an affidavit with the motion.

The statute requires that in order for a rule 12(b) (6) motion to be converted to a motion
for summary judgment, matters outside the pleadings must be presented to the court. However,
in this case, the only supporting material presented with the pleadings were the affidavits of the
parties. However, those affidavits addressed matters which were wholly within the scope of the
pleadings.
While Defendant has claimed that Plaintiff failed to object to Plaintiffs motion to convert
his motion to a motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff, in her memorandum in opposition to
Defendant's motion to dismiss requested that the court "dismiss the motion in its entirety". A
motion for dismissal should properly be treated as an objection. Moreover in this context, failure
to object cannot be construed as consent. State of Utah v. Demar W. Nilson 854 P.2d 1029, 214
Utah Adv. Rep. 45. (facts of this case do not allow us to construe Nilson's articulated lack of
objection as constituting consent to the State's motion to dismiss.) see also Ambrose (failure to
object or silence should not be construed as implied consent. Ambrose, 598 P.2d at 360.)
Accordingly, the order of the trial court should be reversed, and either remanded for a hearing on
a motion to dismiss, or, if this court so chooses, this court should treat the motion as a motion to
dismiss and review this appeal as an appealfroma motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b) (6).
II.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY REFUSING TO APPLY THE PROPER LEGAL
STANDARD TO THE PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS.
Assuming arguendo and in the alternative that converting the motion to dismiss to a motion

for summary judgment was permissible, the Trial Court applied the wrong standard to the motion for
summary judgment. On a motion for summary judgment, if there is any genuine issue as to any
10

material fact, the motion should be denied. Young v. Felorina, 121 Utah 646, 244 P.2d 862 cert,
denied 344 US 886 (1952). see also Jackson v. Dabney, 645 P.2d 613 (Utah 1982) (a motion for
summary judgment should be denied where the evidence presents a genuine issue of material fact
which if resolved in favor of the non-moving party would entitle him to judgment as a matter of
law). Moreover on a motion for summary judgment it is not appropriate for a court to weigh
disputed evidence, W.M. Barned Co. v. Sohio Natural Resources Co. 627 P.2d 56 (Utah 1981), nor
is it necessary for the non-moving party to prove its legal theory; it is only necessary for the nonmoving party to show "facts" controverting the "facts" stated in the moving parties affidavit. Salt
Lake City Corp. v. James Constructors, Inc., 761 P.2d 42 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).
The Trial Court's error on this point is illustrated by the following exchange from the
summary judgment hearing:
MS. MCCONOE: Your Honor, it's not the purpose of a summary judgment
procedure to judge the credibility of the averments of parties or witnesses.
THE COURT: Yes, it is. When one party makes a properly supported motion for
summary judgment, the other party has the obligation to come forward with factual
information indicating there's a legal basis for the claim.
Transcript of Motion for Summary Judgment September 11,2001 before Judge Stephen L.
Henroid, p. 19.
Indeed, the Transcript of the hearing is replete with instances where the court attempts to
weigh the sufficiency of the underlying claims, rather than assess whether disputed issues of fact
exist. However, these examples, while helpful in explaining how this case came before the Court of
Appeals are not really relevant, since the standard of review for the Court of Appeals is for
correctness, without deference to the to the trial court's legal conclusions. Ralph L. Wadsworth
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Constr. Inc., v. West Jordan City, 2000 UT App 49,999 P.2d 1240. Accordingly, each of plaintiffs
claims will be discussed below both for sufficiency under a Rule 12(b)(6) standard and under a
summary judgment standard.

III.

THERE ARE MANY MATERIAL ISSUES OF FACT IN DISPUTE.
Some of the most critical issues in this case turn on whether the plaintiff was represented by

the defendant at the time certain incidents, including sexual incidents took place. Defendant
contends as a core part of his argument that he did not represent Plaintiff during the time that he was
having a sexual relationship with her. However, the dates of representation as well as when the
relationship ended are all disputed by the parties. These issues are material because among other
things, they go to the issue of whether and when the defendant owed a fiduciary duty to the plaintiff.
Importantly, defendant never withdrew his representation of the Plaintiff in a judicial forum. The
following table illustrates some of the disputed issues of fact contained in the pleadings:
Defendant's Statement of Indisputable
Facts
1. Alan Steward is an attorney
2. Alan Stewart was retained by Walters
3. Matter was settled on Feb 18, 1999.
4, Divorce Decree was entered on April
26,1999
5. Romantic relationship began June 1999
6. Walter retained Alan Stewart again in
| Aug. 1999
7. Alan Stewart terminated his relationship
with Walter
8. Alan Stewart represented Walter on a
probate matter after the relationship
terminated

Disputed by Plaintiffs Statement of
Disputed Facts
Not disputed
Not disputed
Disputed by Walter's statements # 1,2,3,
and 5.
Not Disputed
Disputed by Walter's
Disputed by Walter's
8.
Disputed by Walter's
in Walter's affidavit
Disputed by Walter's
Walter's affidavit.
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statement #5
statement #6, 7, and
statement #10, and
statement #10 and in

I

1

Additionally, the respective affidavits of the parties contain numerous other disputed material issues
of fact. A more complete list of disputed issues of fact is included in the discussion of the Plaintiffs
substantive claims below.
IV,

PLAINTIFF'S ALLEGATIONS IN HER COMPLAINT AND AFFIDAVIT,
VIEWED IN THE LIGHT MOST FAVORABLE TO HER, SUPPORT SEVERAL
CAUSES OF ACTION AGAINST THE DEFENDANT. THERE ARE SEVERAL
MATERIAL ISSUES OF FACT IN DISPUTE WHICH, IF PROVED, WOULD
ALLOW A JURY TO FIND IN THE PLAINTIFF'S FAVOR.
A. BATTERY
While Walter is not aware of any Utah cases bearing directly on whether Stewarts' conduct

amounted to battery, the Illinois case of Kling v. Landry, 686 N.E.2d 33 (111. App. 2 Dist.1997) is
instructive. Among other things, in Kling, the court undertook review of the lower court's dismissal
of the Plaintiffs allegation against the defendant.

Plaintiff alleged her attorney (defendant)

committed battery against her when he came to her home, ostensibly to prepare for upcoming
hearings, and had sex with the defendant. Plaintiff alleged on two occasions defendant came to her
home, took off her clothes and initiated sexual intercourse. Further, the plaintiff alleged defendant
was aware she suffered from "mental impairments which could affect her ability to make reasonable
decisions and judgments." Id. at 36.
The lower court dismissed plaintiffs claim of battery for failure to state facts sufficient to
sustain a cause of action. In reversing the lower court's decision, the Illinois Appellate Court
recognized, in effect, that courts should analyze the entirety of the circumstances surrounding an
alleged cause of action (emphasis added). The Kling court found even though plaintiff did not

13

allege defendant's touching was without consent, "she nonetheless alleges that the conduct was
without permission and provocation" and concluded plaintiff stated facts sufficient to sustain a cause
of action for battery. Id. at 41.
Analyzing the totality of the circumstances in the instant case, Stewarts' coercion of Walter
and abuse of her trust was the means Stewart used to commit a battery on the Plaintiff. In order to
satisfy his own prurient interests and appetites and to keep her in Utah, Stewart lied to Walter about
the status of her divorce, telling her the opposing side was holding up entry of the final decree, when
he was aware or should have been aware that it was already entered. Stewart used his position as her
attorney to coerce her to sleep with him through a pattern of lies and manipulation.
Contrary to the analysis contained in Stewarts' memorandum, the court in D.D.Z. v
Molerwav Freight Lines, Inc., 880 P.2d 1 (Utah App. 1994), citing the Utah Supreme Court's
decision in Matheson v Pearson, 619 P.2d 321 (Utah 1980) only recognized three elements necessary
to establish a civil claim of assault and battery in Utah:
"1) The defendant acted, intending to cause harmful or offensive contact with
the plaintiff, or imminent apprehension of such contact; 2) as a result, the
plaintiff was thereby put in imminent apprehension of harm or contact; 3) the
plaintiff suffered injuries proximately caused by the defendant's actions." Id.
at 2-3.
Stewarts' memorandum goes on to argue a fourth requirement not recognized by the court in
D.D.Z., that the Defendant's acts resulted in an unpermitted touching of the Plaintiff. Stewart goes on
to claim that because Walter "cannot establish an intent to harm or a lack of consent, Count I must fail
as a matter of law." The question of whether Walter can establish an intent to harm is factual in
nature, as is the question of consent. However, under the D.D.Z. analysis, lack of consent is not a
14

prerequisite of civil assault and battery. Under the standard of review applicable to Stewarts' motion,
factual issues must be viewed in a light most favorable to Walter. Further, the D.D.Z., court also
stated, "Because the elements of assault and battery require an "actor," the analysis shouldfirstfocus
on whether [the defendant] was the requisite actor. If he was an actor in [the] episode, then his intent
could be inferred from his actions." Id. at 3.
Walter's complaint alleges that Alan Stewart touched her without her consent and that he did
so with intent to harm. By her complaint and affidavit supporting this memorandum (assuming her
allegations to be true) Walter provides an ample factual basis for finding that Stewart committed
battery. Even if consent were to become an issue in this case, Walter's complaint and
affidavit establish, for purposes of this court's review of Stewarts' motion, under the entirety of the
circumstances Walter did not consent to a sexual relationship with Alan Stewart.
The trial court stated in its one paragraph opinion that "Count I, civil battery may have merit,
but is barred by the one year statute of limitations. Plaintiff testified in her affidavit, that the
Defendant physically touched her on numerous occasions throughout the year 2000. Plaintiffs
complaint wasfiledon February 2, of 2001. Additionally, Plaintiffs affidavit states that Defendant
represented her at a hearing to change her name on November 2,2000. After the hearing, Defendant
grabbed the plaintiff around her waist (a harmful or offensive touching without her consent) and asked
her to have sex with him. This incident alone contains all the elements of battery and occurred three
months prior to when the Plaintiff filed her lawsuit. Thus, the trial court's finding on this point
was clearly erroneous and its order should be reversed.

B. NEGLIGENCE OR RECKLESS MISCONDUCT

As noted in Stewart's memorandum, the elements of a cause of action for negligence are duty,
breach of duty, causation, and damages. Gerbich v. Numed Inc., 977 P.2d 1205,1207 (Utah 1999).
Contrary to the assertions contained in Stewarts' memorandum, the allegations and evidence
presented in Walter's complaint and affidavit are sufficient to meet all four of the requirements to
sustain her action for negligence.
Duty
First, with regard to Stewarts' duty to Walter as her attorney, Alan Stewart owed her the duty
to conform to the standard of care of a reasonable and prudent attorney. Importantly, the Utah Rules
of Professional Conduct prohibit an attorneyfromhaving sexual relations with a client. Chapter 13,
Rule 8.4(g) (2000):
"It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to...(g) Engage in sexual relations
with a client that exploits the lawyer-client relationship:...(2) Except for a
spousal relationship or a sexual relationship that existed at the commencement
of the lawyer-client relationship, sexual relations between a lawyer and a client
shall be presumed to be exploitive."
This rule establishes the duty of care a lawyer owes his client. Walter's complaint alleges that Stewart
was her attorney when he commenced pursuit of an intimate physical relationship with Walter. For
example, Defendant called Plaintiff in April of 1999 and told her that "as long as she was his client,
he had an excuse to call her; and that on April 15,2000, Defendant called Plaintiff and said: "if you
move to Maryland, how are we supposed to have a relationship?" Affidavit of Beth Walter, p. 3-4. If
these allegations do not clearly establish an attorney client relationship, they at least created a material
issue of fact which would defeat summary judgment.
If the behavior at issue in this case had occurred in an employment context, it would no
doubt be actionable as sexual harassment under TITLE VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Why

should this behavior go unpunished, when it occurs in an attorney's office but actionable in an
employment context. Arguably, an attorney as fiduciary owes a higher duty to his client than an
employer owes to his employee.
Breach
The next question to address is whether Stewart breached his duty to Walter. Walter argues
that Alan Stewart initiated a sexual relationship with her while he was still her attorney, that he
sexually preyed on her, that he harassed and abused her during the course of his representation, that he
used his position as her attorney to withhold pertinent information regarding the status of her case, in
order to further his own interests and that he deliberately mislead Walter to keep her from moving to
Maryland. Taken as true under the standard of review applicable to Stewarts' motion, Walter's
unrefuted facts and allegations are more than sufficient to establish that Stewarts breached the duty of
care owed to Walter. Indeed, Stewart's behavior as alleged in the complaint, amounts to recklessness.
In Matheson v Pearson, Supra at 322, 323, the Utah Supreme Court stated:
"...reckless misconduct results when a person with no intent to cause harm,
intentionally performs an act so unreasonable and dangerous that he knows or
should know, it is highly probable that harm will result...It is the absence of
intent to harm which renders reckless misconduct or reckless disregard of safety
a form of negligence."
The Defendant has admitted that he had a sexual relationship with the Plaintiff, but disputed
the allegation that Plaintiff was his client when the relationship occurred. Again, this dispute
of fact is sufficient to defeat summary judgment.
Causation
Generally, causation "cannot be resolved as a matter of law." Butterfield v. Okubo, 831 P.2d
97, 106 (Utah 1992). "Proximate cause is an issue of fact. Thus, only if there is no evidence upon

which a reasonable jury could infer causation, is summary judgment appropriate." Harline v. Barker,
854 P.2d 595,600 (Utah App.) (citations omitted), cert, denied, 862 P.2d 1356 (Utah 1993). In other
words, Utah litigants do not easily dispose of the element of causation on summary judgment.
Kilpatrick v. Wiley, at 1293.
Walter's complaint specifically alleges that Stewarts' conduct was the direct and proximate
cause of her injuries, which include: Walter became mentally distraught; she suffered enormous
psychic pain; she became incapacitated emotionally to a nearly irreversible extent; and she required
psychological treatment as a direct result of Stewarts' actions. Stewart has not rebutted these
allegations, and even if he had submitted some evidence contradicting these allegations, the result
would be a dispute about a material issue of fact. Again, either standard of review, Walter's
allegations support an inference of causation sufficient to defeat summary judgment.
Damages
Finally, a plaintiff must establish damages to recover under a negligence theory. And once
more, the question of damages is factual in nature. Accordingly, Walter alleges that she incurred
numerous significant damages as direct and proximate result of Stewarts' negligent or reckless
misconduct. In addition to emotional pain and suffering, Walter has incurred monetary damages as a
result of her need for medical and psychological therapy. Taken as true, the allegations and facts set
forth in Walter's complaint and affidavit are sufficient to establish a prima facie claim of negligence.
Each element has been specifically pled, and has not been refuted by the Defendant. Thus, summary
judgment on the negligence claim should be denied.

C. BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY

Breach of fiduciary duty provides a basis for legal malpractice separate and apart from
professional negligence. Kilpatrick v. Wiley, (supra) at 1293. In Kilpatrick, supra at 1290, the court
outlined these elements: "1) an attorney - client relationship; 2) breach of the attorney'sfiduciaryduty
to the client; 3) causation, both actual and proximate; and 4) damages suffered by the client."
Each of these elements identified under Kilpatrick are factual in nature. In particular, the
Kilpatrick court went to great pains to point out:
"Causation is a highly fact-sensitive element of any cause of action. In Utah
"[pjroximate causation is '[t]hat cause which in natural and continuous
sequence, unbroken by an efficient intervening cause, produces the injury and
without which the result would not have occurred.'"....Utah courts have
recognized that "[f]act sensitive cases...do not lend themselves to a
determination on summary judgment."" Id at 1292.
Walter has provided evidence and alleged facts which, for purposes of reviewing Stewarts'
motion, must be accepted as true and in a light most favorable to the plaintiff. The evidence and
allegations applicable to Walter's cause of action for breach offiduciaryduty are: 1) that there existed
between Walter and Stewarts an attorney - client relationship; 2) that Stewarts breached the fiduciary
duty it owed Walter, when prior to termination of the attorney - client relationship, Alan Stewart,
strictly for his own gratification, coerced Walter into a sexual relationship through lies, deceit and
misrepresentations and that he otherwise violated the duty of care he owed his client; 3) that Stewart's
conduct was the direct and proximate cause of injury to Walter. Had Alan Stewart held himself to
ordinary standards of professional competence and refrained from using his position as a trusted
fiduciary advisor to coerce Walter into a sexual relationship, Walter would not have suffered the
injuries set forth in her complaint; and 4) that the injuries to Walter included physical, emotional, and
monetary damages.
"Courts throughout the United States have not hesitated to impose civil sanctions upon

attorneys who breach theirfiduciaryduties to their clients, which sanctions have been imposed
separately and apartfromprofessional discipline." Kilpatrick v. Wiley at 1293 citing Maritrans
GP Inc. v. Pepper, Hamilton & Scheetz, 529 Pa. 241, 602 A.2d 1277,1286 (Pa. 1992). Such
actions are grounded on the fundamental principle that attorneys must be completely loyal to their
clients and must never use their position of trust to take advantage of client confidences for
themselves or for other parties. Margulies ex rel. Margulies v. Upchurch, 696 P.2d 1195,1204
(Utah 1985). A breach offiduciaryduty by an attorney is actionable whether it involves
financial claims or physical damage resulting from the violation. Barbara A. v. John G.
(1983) 145 Cal. App. 3d 369, 383 (emphasis added.)
Analysis of causation and damages under this claim would be similar that of negligence as
discussed above under negligence. In addition, analysis of thefraudclaims, infra, is also relevant
to analysis of whether Defendant breached hisfiduciaryduty to the Plaintiff.
D. INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS
To recover for intentional infliction of emotional distress a plaintiff must show: (1) that
defendant's conduct was outrageous and intolerable in that it offended against the generally
accepted standards of decency and morality (2) intention to cause or reckless disregard of the
probability of causing emotional distress, (3) severe emotional suffering and (4) actual and
proximate causation of the emotional distress. Retherford v. At&T Communications of Mt.
States, Inc. 844 p. 2d 949 (Utah 1992) see also Samms v. Eccles 358 P.2d 344 (1961).
Perhaps the most difficult element for Plaintiff to prove is that the conduct is so extreme
and outrageous as to offend all notions of common decency. The Utah Rules of Professional
Conduct provide specific guidance on what notions of common decency are in the context of an

attorney-client relationship: Sexual relations between a lawyer and a client shall be presumed
to be exploitative. Utah Code of Judicial Administration Rule 8.4 (g) (2000) (emphasis
added).
In McDaniel v. Gile a California court held that an attorney who engaged in a sexual
relationship with his client in the midst of a dissolution proceeding has satisfied the requirement
that the conduct be outrageous:
Defendant had a special relationship with plaintiff in that she was a client and plaintiff was
her attorney representing her in a dissolution of marriage proceeding. Plaintiff was in a
position of actual or apparent power over defendant. Defendant was peculiarly susceptible
to emotional distress because of her pending marital dissolution. Plaintiff was aware of
defendant's circumstances. The withholding by a retained attorney of legal services when
sexual favors are not granted by a client and engaging in sexual harassment of the client
constitute acts of outrageous conduct under these circumstances. McDaniel v. Gile (supra).
Defendant will no doubt attempt to distinguish this casefromMcDaniel because plaintiff
has not alleged that defendant conditioned his representation of the Plaintiff on sexual favors.
However, defendant did represent the plaintiff in a show cause hearing for no charge and later
after he represented her in a motion to change her name he grabbed her around the waist and
asked her to have sex with him. Again, whether defendant's conduct can be construed as
suggesting a quid pro quo is a question of fact.
In DiSandro, a case in which the plaintiff alleged intentional infliction of emotional
distress resulting from a sexual relationship with her attorney during the course of dissolution
proceedings, the court similarly recognized that a sexual relationship between an attorney and his
client satisfied the outrageous and offensive requirement of the tort of intentional infliction of
emotional distress: "had there been any competent medical evidence to establish the required
causal connection between Vallinotofs alleged shingles and DiSandrofs conduct, we would not

hesitate to uphold the trial justice's submission of the intentional infliction of emotional distress
count to the jury." Maria Del Rosario Vallino v. Edmond A. DiSandro et al. RI.35 (1997).
Defendant may attempt to use this case to argue that that the plaintiff has not shown competent
medical evidence of emotional distress. However, the Plaintiff has alleged that she suffered
emotional damage including humiliation and depression and is undergoing treatment with a
licensed psychologist to deal with the damage caused the Defendant. Viewed in the light most
favorable to her, those allegations are sufficient to defeat summary judgment.
The second element of this tort is intention or reckless disregard of the probability of
causing emotional distress. While defendant Stewart probably did not intend to cause emotional
distress to Walter, he should have known that engaging in a sexual relationship with a vulnerable
client would result in emotional trauma to her, especially because he had to lie to her in order to
get her to have sex with him. Even if he had intended to marry the plaintiff, Stewart should have
realized that the plaintiff would suffer greatly when she found out that he was already married.
The question of whether his conduct was reckless is a question of fact and not appropriate for
resolution on a motion for summary judgment.
The other elements of this tort, causation and damages, are identical to those discussed
above in the discussion of negligence and the same analysis applies here. In sum, plaintiff has
alleged all the elements of the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress and those
elements are supported by the plaintiffs complaint and affidavit. When viewed in the light most
favorable to the Plaintiff, they are sufficient to support a cause of action on this claim.
E. FRAUD
As noted by Stewart in his memorandum, to maintain an action forfraud,Walter must show:

"by clear and convincing evidence... 1) that a representation was made; 2)
concerning a presently existing material fact; 3) which was false; 4) which the
one making the misrepresentation either a) knew to be false, or b) made
recklessly knowing he had insufficient knowledge upon which to base such
representation; 5) for the purpose of inducing the other party to act upon it; 6)
that the other party acting reasonably and in ignorance of its falsity; 7) did in
fact rely upon it; 8) and was thereby induced to act; 9) to its injury and damage/'
Cheever v. Schramm, 577 P.2d 951, 954 (Utah 1978).
By definition under Cheever, the question of whether Walter has met the burden of proving
fraud is a factual determination. Accordingly, under the standard of review applicable to Stewarts'
motion, the allegations and evidence presented by Walter must be analyzed in a light most favorable
to her claims. The elements of fraud are set forth in the Plaintiffs complaint and affidavit as follows.
Element 1 (representation): Alan Stewart made representations to the Plaintiff, including
but not limited to representing: that her divorce action was not final, when in fact it was; that if Walter
moved to Maryland she would have to return to Utah to finalize her divorce; that he was not married,
when in fact he was married for over 20 years; that he was desirous of a committed, monogamous
relationship with Walter, when in fact he was a married father of five children.
Element 2 ( material fact): The representations made by Alan Stewart were material. On
numerous occasions Walter informed him that she wanted to know if her divorce was final so that she
could move to Maryland with her affairs in Utah settled. When Alan Stewart coerced Walter into a
sexual relationship, she repeatedly emphasized that she expected their relationship to be monogamous
and Alan Stewart agreed that it would. Further, Walter made numerous inquiries regarding Alan
Stewart's marital status and he repeatedly assured her that he was divorced.
Elements 3 and 4 (falsity and knowledge): The representations made by Alan Stewart were
false and Alan Stewart knew them to be false. Stewarts' memorandum emphasizes that Walter's
divorce was finalized when the stipulation was signed by the parties in February 1999. However,

Alan Stewart, in his capacity as Walter's attorney, repeatedly advised Walter that her divorce was not
final, even after the divorce decree had been entered by the court in April 1999. Further, Alan Stewart
lied to Walter about his marital status and relationship with his wife and he did so knowing that
Walter was relying on his lies in making decisions regarding relocating to Maryland and becoming
involved in a sexual relationship with him.
Element 5 (inducement): Fully aware of Walter's emotional vulnerability and using his
influence and position as her trusted legal advisor for his own sexual gratification, Alan Stewart
repeatedly lied to Walter and misrepresented the status of her legal affairs for the purpose of coercing
Walter into a sexual relationship.
Element 6 (reasonableness): On the other hand, Walter took every reasonable precaution
necessary to protect her interests. As her attorney, it is inconceivable that Alan Stewart now argues
Walter was not entitled to rely on his expertise in assessing her legal obligations or otherwise trust
him. The very essence of the attorney - client relationship is trust and over the course representing her
during the divorce, Walter grew to trust Alan Stewart as trusted legal advisor and friend. There was
simply no basis in their relationship for inferring that Alan Stewart was anything other than what he
purported to be. Further, in terms of inquiring regarding Alan Stewart's marital status, Walter
undertook reasonable investigatory steps. Alan Stewart did not wear a wedding ring; while he kept
pictures of children in his office, he did not have a picture of his wife; he introduced Walter as his
girlfriend to his associates; he took Walter to public places and on business trips; and most
importantly he spent a considerable amount of time with Walter including afternoons, evenings,
important holidays, and weekends.

Elements 7 and 8 (reliance and inducement):

Walter relied on Alan Stewart's

misrepresentation and lies. At his behest and urging, she canceled her relocation to Maryland and
agreed to enter into a committed, monogamous sexual relationship with him.
Element 9 (injury): As a result of thefraudperpetrated on her by Stewarts, Walter suffered
physical, mental emotional and monetary damages.
Under the applicable standard of review the allegations and evidence presented by Walter,
under her cause of action for fraud, provide sufficient grounds to deny Stewarts' motion. Again,
many of the elements of a fraud claim are factual in nature and are disputed by the parties. Thus
Defendant's motion should be denied.

F. BREACH OF CONTRACT
Under a case previously cited, the Utah Court of Appeals recognized,
"[L]egal malpractice is a generic term for at least three distinct causes of action
available to clients who suffer damages because of their lawyers' misbehavior.
Clients wronged by their lawyers may sue for damages based on breach of
contract, breach offiduciaryduty, or negligence....Regardless of whether the
cause of action is based on negligence, breach of contract, or breach of fiduciary
duty, the central purpose of the law of legal malpractice is to guard against and
to remedy exploitation of the power lawyers possess over their clients' lives and
property." Kilpatrick v. Wiley, 909 P.2d 1283,1289 (Utah App. 1996).
Under Utah law, all contracts whether express or implied, includes a variety of covenants as set forth
in Plaintiffs sixth cause of action including, but not limited to, covenants of good faith and fair
dealing.
Plaintiff has alleged that Alan Stewart breached these covenants by using his position as
Walter's trusted legal advisor to exploit her for his own sexual gratification. Under the court's

analysis in Kilpatrick, Walter is entitled to plead and develop evidence through the discovery process,
based on an alternative cause of action grounded on breach of contract. In order to evaluate that
claim, afinderof fact would be required to determine whether a contract existed, what the terms and
implied covenants of that were and whether they were breached. These are all factual questions,
incapable of resolution on a motion for summary judgment.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff has alleged all the elements of her various claims against the Defendant, and has
supported those allegations with facts in her complaint and affidavit. Since defendant has
disputed these factual matters, summary judgment should be denied. Plaintiff urges this court to
find that an attorney who engages in a sexual relationship with his client in the course of
representation, or at least in the course of representation in a divorce proceeding, has breached
fiduciary duties and engaged in negligent and outrageous conduct as a matter of law. If the court
elects not to sofind,it should still allow plaintiffs claims of battery,fraud,and breach of contract
to be presented to thefinderof fact.
DATED this _ 2 _ day of March, 2002.

WINGO & RINEHART

T^W^^
Kathleen McConkie
Attorney for Plaintiff

t^K^O
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1

SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH - SEPTEMBER 11, 2001

2

HONORABLE STEPHEN L. HENRIOD PRESIDING

3

P R O C E E D I N G S

4

THE COURT:

5

MS. MCCONKIE:

6

Ready?
Kathleen McKonkie

on behalf of the plaintiff.

7

MR. SKEEN:

8

MS. MCCONKIE:

9

THE COURT:

10

We are, your Honor,

Skeen.

Randall Skeen on behalf of the defendant.
Plaintiff is present before you.

Let's go ahead with the argument, Mr.

I am treating it as a motion for summary judgment.

11

MR. SKEEN:

12

going to go on that.

13

THE COURT:

Okay.

I was wondering which way we were

Well, by the time you both filed

14

affidavits you'd taken it pretty much out of the world of a

15

motion to dismiss.

16

MR. SKEEN:

I think that's correct.

17

THE COURT:

The response to the Reply Memorandum is

18
19

also stricken.
MR. SKEEN:

Thank you.

Your Honor, basically, as the

20

Court has obviously reviewed, and they're fairly lengthy

21

pleadings and I think this is a, at least pleading wise, is a

22

fairly confusing, fact intensive case. But basically where

23

this case starts and ends is in a romantic relationship.

24

That's what gives rise to all of the plaintiff's claims and

25

really that's where this thing is going to start and stop.

1

Basically - and actually I should inquire of the Court, I know

2

counsel made a motion to file an amended complaint.

3

know that that was ever addressed.

4

THE COURT:

I don't

Oh, well, I granted the motion a long

5

time ago and the amended complaint was filed and, frankly, it's

6

as if all of your research was done in light of the first

7

complaint because the amended complaint only has four causes of

8

action.

9

MR. SKEEN:

That's correct.

10

THE COURT:

But that's what we're working off.

11

MR. SKEEN:

Okay. Well, I was uncertain as to

12

whether or not that had been granted and so if I seem to divert

13

over to some of the stricken causes, please advise me.

14

But in any event, the plaintiff hired the defendant

15

as an attorney back in I believe 1998.

16

divorce which subsequently was settled by virtue of ei

17

stipulation which was executed in February of 1999 and a

18

divorce decree was entered in April of *99. Now, according to

19

the allegations within the complaint, I believe the

20

relationship commenced approximately two months after the

21

decree was entered which would be in about June of 1999.

22
23
24
25

THE COURT:

It was to handle a

But before, according to the plaintiff,

the defendant told her the decree had been entered.
MR. SKEEN:

I don't, again, I'm not sure that that

makes a heck of a lot of difference.

We do know that the

1

decree was entered.

2

THE COURT:

(Inaudible)

3

MR. SKEEN:

On April 26 of 1999. Subsequently there

4

was an order to show cause that was filed in August of *99

5

based upon her refusal to pay some financial obligations. That

6

was resolved by virtue of her paying it. And then the last

7

instance where any legal action was undertaken I believe was in

8

November of 2000 in which a perfunctory name change was entered

9

and it ended at that point.

10

Now, as I looked at this complaint and, I guess even

11

the amended complaint, many of the allegations, they seem to

12

have tried to repackage some criminal allegations into civil

13

causes of action, specifically some intentional torts. Now,

14

generally, I'd like to address specifically basically, at least

15

start with the battery.

16

complaint, we do not have allegations as to the specific dates

17

and we know since the complaint was filed in February of 2001

18

that anything prior to February of 2000 would be barred by the

19

statute.

20

The concern and even in the amended

But, notwithstanding that, and, again, I'll sort of

21

defer back to our brief because on the battery issues we did, I

22

think address those semi, semi well.

23

failed in any sense to show that he intended any kind of

24

intentional harm and her affidavit doesn't even really get to

25

that point. He is alleged, I mean, again, if you look at this

In any event, she has

1

thing as what it really was which was nothing more than a

2

romantic relationship, there was never intention, any

3

intentional harm that could be shown.

4

THE COURT:

I don't know that you can say that when

5

admittedly these are not unusual circumstances but she alleges

6

that he lied to her about his marital relationship and nothing

7

would have happened without.

8

wasn't intended harm but it would certainly fall into* the

9

reckless category.

10

MR. SKEEN:

11

THE COURT: Sure.

12

MR. SKEEN:

If that's true, maybe there

Well, may I approach?

Thank you.

There was a case that came

13

down subsequent to our filing this motion which is Sherman vs.

14

Sherman.

15

circumstance to this case.

16

Utah Supreme Court came down.

17

patient sued her psychiatrist for intentional infliction of

18

emotional distress and also for medical malpractice.

19

Dever entered or granted a motion for summary judgment on both

20

counts. The medical malpractice, I don't know that that has

21

much to do with this case because essentially they missed the

22

statute on that but what's very interesting is on the

23

intentional infliction of emotional distress damages, the Court

24

upheld the motion for summary judgment and actually cited a

25

number of cases and the restatement of torts and the Supreme

This is a case that involved factually similar
It was Judge Dever's case and the
Basically, in this case a

Judge

Court in citing a prior case which is, I think, Sams vs.
Eccles, indicated that the law only or will intervene only
where the distress inflicted is so severe that no reasonable
person could be expected to endure it. That is the law.
Now, factually, in this case, the allegations are
very similar to that case.

The psychiatrist had treated her

for some 38 visits, stopped treating her, immediately
thereafter entered into a romantic relationship*

The plaintiff

in that case alleged that the psychiatrist had promised to
marry her.

He promised to take case of her, made a number of

admittedly misrepresentations and she alleged that there had
been a transference.

That as a result of his acts she had

become, her affections were transferred from her husband to him
which resulted in a divorce.

She then went into what she

alleged as very heavy-duty counseling.
And the court very simply said that however
unpleasant the emotional distress that plaintiff alleges is
indistinguishable from that commonly suffered by others in an
intimate - when an intimate relationship fails.

That, your

Honor, is exactly what happened here. And although she may
allege that she was harmed, she may allege that she's damaged,
that she's had to have psycho-therapeutic services. None of
this in indistinguishable from that which is suffered in other
cases.

Very simply put. Her own affidavit doesn't even, you

know, go any farther than that.

1

Now back, and I diverted just a little bit, but back

2

to the Court's indication that she somehow could enter into a

3

sexual relationship and then withdraw consent, that's addressed

4

in a case right on point is the Neal case in which you've got a

5

husband and wife situation where the wife says he promised to

6

be faithful to me and, again, her affidavit says he promised to

7

be faithful to me, he promised to enter into a monogamist

8

relationship.

9

you can't retroactively come back and say I was defrauded into

Well, (inaudible) said that has nothing to do,

10

entering into a sexual relationship.

11

what we have here and by virtue of that, that not only kills

12

the fraud aspects that she's alleged, it also takes out the

13

intentional infliction of emotional distress.

14

withdraw consent.

15

because the touching has to be un-consented to essentially

16

unwarranted.

17

consensual relationship until she discovered that in fact this

18

gentleman was married.

19

Again, that's exactly

She cannot

It also spills over into the battery claims

She consented to it.

It was an ongoing

And for the purpose of this hearing, your Honor,

20

we're not going to concede that he represented to her that he

21

wasn't married.

22

evidence will come out.

23

We're not. We don't concede that and the

But what's really interesting as well is one of the

24

other elements, particularly in the fraud aspect, is reliance.

25

She has to reasonably rely.

Well, your Honor, she called his

1

wife.

2

relationship going on which resulted in the defendant' s

3

divorce.

4

on blinders and then after the fact she knew.

5

obviously was suspicious enough that she called his home. So,

6

that kills the reliance aspect as well.

7

She called his wife and told his wife that there was a

You cannot have reasonable reliance, ignorantly put
I mean she

With respect to the legal malpractice claims, in

8

fact, actually just the general negligence claims first because

9

I think those have still been alleged.

But as I read the

10

complaint, somehow plaintiff is trying to alleged that if

11

intentional torts fail then negligence, some kind of general

12

negligence is going to apply.

13

been plead with any kind of particularity that would apply but

14

secondly, there is no catch all negligence standard that is

15

going to grab any failed intentional acts.

Well, first of all, it hasn't

16

Now, I know as lawyers with alternative pleading, we

17

allege that all the time. We allege somebody defrauded us and

18

if he didn't defraud us then he was negligent in taking our

19

money.

20

hasn't been properly plead.

21

eluded or substantiated by her affidavit.

22

But there just isn't a catch all that applies. It
The elements haven't been properly

Now, with regard to the professional negligence

23

claims, she states there is a duty but I don't see how there

24

could be a breach.

25

THE COURT: Are you talking about the fiduciary duty?

MR. SKEEN:

Yeah.

Well, no.

Let's talk first about

that it's just a simple legal malpractice claim and then I'll
get to the breach of fiduciary duty.
THE COURT:

I don't think we really have one of those

in the amended complaint.
MR. SKEEN:

Oh, did you take that out?

I'm sorry.

I'm sorry, I THE COURT:

But that was -

MS. MCCONKIE:

No, we're talking about malpractice.

We're talking about breach of contract which is THE COURT: Right.
MS. MCCONKIE:

Breach of fiduciary duty.

THE COURT:

Okay.

All right.

MR. SKEEN:

Well, first of all she's got to allege

there is a fiduciary duty which could be breached and I guess
in the context of it we need to look at what duty was there.
Well, there is a duty of honesty, a duty to handle her case
well, a duty to act, work in a workman-like manner.

She hired

him to do a divorce which resulted in a stipulated default
settlement.

Whether he is a good guy or a bad guy, it resulted

in a stipulated settlement of the divorce.
The second order to show cause, he's a good guy, he's
a bad guy, it was settled by virtue of her paying the money she
was ordered to under the Decree of Divorce. And as I've
indicated, she's never alleged that he violated the trust and
8

1

therefore she got a bad deal on her divorce. None of that has

2

ever happened.

3

And then the third instance of representation is a

4

simple fairly perfunctory name change where she wanted, I

5

understand, to revert to her maiden name.

6

accomplished.

7

a sexual relationship or he's not, it was entered.

8

be any professional malpractice here because she can't allege a

9

breach of his duty which results in any kind of damages. It

That was

If he's a good guy or a bad guy, if he's having
There can't

10

falls back again to this catch-all let's throw in some kind of

11

negligence because he lied to me about whether or not he was

12

married.

13

with her and we do as lawyers, I don't know that we have a duty

14

as lawyers to be honest about our personal lives where it

15

doesn't affect the underlying attorney/client relationship.

16

mean she doesn't allege and she can't prove that, hey, because

17

we were having a relationship he did a real bad job on my case.

18

Because we were having a relationship, I would have hired

19

somebody else that would have done a much better job.

20

there or any damages and, therefore, those causes of action

21

must fail as well.

22
23

And as such, you know, if he has a duty to be honest

I

It's not

The breach of fiduciary duty, and I'm assuming they
still have that.

24

THE COURT: Yes.

25

MR. SKEEN: Again, what fiduciary duty was breached?

1

What is owed first of all. He didnft control or handle any of

2

her money or property.

3

did he, was entered into and did he owe her a duty upon?

4

guess I don't understand it.

5

pleadings.

6

understand it from the affidavits.

7

possible fiduciary duty there could have been.

8
9
10

What possible fiduciary relationship
And I

I don't understand it from the

I don't understand it from the opposition.

I don't

I don't understand what

Now, the Kilpatrick case was really interesting in
that it held that breach of professional conduct does not give
rise to a breach of fiduciary duty.

I quote:

11

"The rules of professional conduct are not

12

a basis for civil liability."

13

And I think that's what we're talking about here.

14

entered into this relationship with her and obtained her house

15

or her bank account or something of value and then stole it,

16

wasted it, misappropriated it then, yeah, we're here likely or

17

at least arguably for a claim of breach of fiduciary duty.

18

it's just simply not there.

19

If he

But

Also, the Clean case which was the plaintiff's own

20

case, states that a breach occurs only, only if the legal

21

services are contingent upon sexual involvement.

22

because remember the divorce is entered.

23

relationship, there is an enforcement issue and a name change

24

but he didn't say and she didn't allege and hasn't stated in

They weren't

They enter into the

25 J her affidavit that, hey, you wouldn't have done this name
10

1

change except that Ifm having a relationship with you. So, she

2

fails there.

3

Secondly, that somehow he compromised the client's

4

legal interest by virtue of a relationship.

5

that could be.

6

money and that's it.

7

there was no compromise there at all.

8
9

I donft know how

It was an enforcement issue. She paid the
He did the name change and that's it. So

And then, finally, that he used, somehow used
personal information to seduce. Well, remember there's not a

10

relationship when this - or there is not a or there is not a

11

legal attorney/client ongoing relationship when he enters into

12

the relationship with her. And what's born out by that is the

13

fact that when she was served with the order to show cause on

14

the enforcement issues, it wasn't served to him as her lawyer,

15

it was served on her personally and then she engaged him and

16

asked him to do it.

17

But, again, none of these things fit, Judge. She

18

hasn't been able to demonstrate anything more than akin to

19

somebody that goes into a bar without a wedding ring and tells

20

a woman he's not married and away they go. And, therefore,

21

there is just no basis and we believe that summary judgment

22

should be granted in all causes.

23

THE COURT:

That you, Mr. Skeen.

24

Ms. McConkie?

25

MS. MCCONKIE:

Thank you, your Honor. Your Honor, we
11

1

do agree with one thing counsel stated.

2

intensive case and we agree that the Courtfs going to - in

3

order to determine some of these the Court is going to have to

4

review the facts.

5

This is a very fact

Now, the defendants have alleged that there are no

6

indisputable facts but there are some indisputable facts and I

7

think some of the undisputable facts are a key to whether a

8

summary judgment motion should be granted or not.

9

all, they allege that the matter was settled on the 18th of

First of

10

February, 1999.

11

that time there was no divorce entered.

12

done divorce work knows that there are other pleadings that

13

need to be entered and submitted to the clerk, records and to

14

the judge and executed before a divorce can be finalized.

15

in fact, a divorce was not finalized until the 26th of April.

16

That was when the stipulation was signed.

At

Anyone who has even

And,

Another thing the Court needs to understand I think

17

and clearly understand is that even after the divorce was done

18

my client had been talking to Mr. Stewart regarding an adoption

19

and he had agreed that he would handle the Utah portion of the

20

adoption even though the adoption hadn't -

21

THE COURT:

22

MS. MCCONKIE:

23

Honor.

This isn't in her affidavit, is it?
Well, she, I believe it is, your

She talked about the adoption in her affidavit.

24

THE COURT:

I don't believe she did.

25

MS. MCCONKIE:

(Inaudible)
12

1

THE COURT:

She didn't-

2

MS. MCCONKIE:

I want to hear about it.

I'll have my client look through her

3

affidavit, your Honor, and maybe I can continue and she could

4

find it for me.

5
6
7

And, your Honor, and he agreed to do the Utah portion
of that adoption.
Additionally, your Honor, there is a difference in

8

terms of the facts in terms of when the relationship started.

9

The divorce was finalized on the 26th of April, 1999, and, if

10

you read the affidavit of the plaintiff you will see that they

11

did start to date. They didn't have a sexual relationship

12

prior to June, excuse me, July 1999, but they started to date

13

where he called her, he took her out and that is - so in terms

14

of the relationship when did the romantic relationship start?

15

It started prior to the time the divorce was finalized.

16

Additionally, your Honor, Mr. Stewart never filed a

17

withdrawal of counsel. He never withdrew from being her

18

attorney and as exemplified there were other post-divorce

19

actions that occurred and he was there and handled those for

20

her as well as the adoption and the name change.

21

So, we have some very important disputable facts.

22

Mr. Stewart alleges in his facts that he terminated the

23

relationship with Walter.

24

in Walter's memorandum.

25

the probate matter that the relationship had been terminated at

That is also disputed by number 10

He represented that when he started

13

1

that point and that is also disputed.

Your Honor, there are,

2

this is a fact intensive situation and really the Court will

3

need to have evidence in terms of the facts to determine which

4

facts, in fact, are correct.

5

THE COURT: Have you done any discovery?

6

MS. MCCONKIE: No, your Honor, we've done nothing as

7

of yet. We have, we have prepared some interrogatories but we

8

received the motion for summary judgment fairly early on and we

9

are now just having it heard.

The matter was initially before

10

Judge Frederick who recused himself because he had a conflict

11

(inaudible) we're here. We haven't actually, you know, had our

12

discovery served (inaudible).

13

Honor, that Walter is entitled to her day in Court and an

14

opportunity to gather the evidence to support the allegations

15

of her complaint and she also, and, as the Court understands

16

and realizes, that she has a right to do that.

17

(Both talking)

18

THE COURT:

19

And it is our opinion, your

But you've had several months to have

started that.

20

MS. MCCONKIE:

21

THE COURT:

(Inaudible) Pardon me?

One of you initial responses to this

22

motion was we need to do discovery so we can get some facts out

23

at least with specific causes of action in mind.

24

MS. MCCONKIE:

That's right, your Honor.

25

THE COURT: And you haven't started.

You've had
14

1

months -

2

MS. MCCONKIE: Well, no.

3

THE COURT:

4

MS. MCCONKIE:

- to get started.
No, your Honor, we have started our

5

discovery.

We haven't served it but we thought we would go

6

through this summary judgment motion before we did.

7

summary judgment motion has taken quite a long time to get

8

scheduled so we have, I will proffer to the Court that we have

9

started discovery.

And the

10

THE COURT: You should have had it served months ago,

11

MS. MCCONKIE: Your Honor, in terms of the battery

12

claim, the claim that Alan Stewart did not intend to harm

13

Walter and that Walter consent to Alan Stewart's advances to

14

her, I think the issue there, the important issue, is whether

15

Alan Stewart acted in a manner which he knew or should have

16

known would result in harmful or offensive contact with Walter.

17

And, frankly, he knew that. He was in a, he used his fiduciary

18

position to manipulate and disarm Walter and now he asks the

19

Court to shield him from the consequences of his actions.

20

her complaint Walter alleges in paragraph 23 that due to her

21

state of mind and emotional condition she was legally incapable

22

of consenting to a sexual relationship with Alan Stewart and

23

even if for purposes of argument she did consent, Alan Stewart

24

engaged in a pattern of fraud and deception for the sole

25

purpose of which was to prevent Walter from making an informed

In

15

1

decision.

2

relationship.

3

There was no informed consent regarding their

And in terms of whether he had the intent for harm in

4

terms of the battery claim or whether she consented, those are

5

also fact intensive.

6

to have evidence and to be determine, and the Court needs to

7

determine what happened there.

Those are issues which need to be, need

8

Now, we did, we did use the Neal case in our

9

memorandum and although Neal involves an Idaho Court's

10

interpretation of the law and it is distinguishable on the

11

basis that Alan Stewart and Walter discussed the marital

12

relationship and discussed these things before entering into a

13

sexual relationship.

14

to Walter regarding the status of her divorce and his marriage

15

that she consented to the relationship and he knew that if he

16

was successful in lying to Walter and in deceiving her, she

17

would not have sex with him - if he were not successful she

18

would not have sex with him.

19

not be at issue in Alan Stewart's and should not be tied to

20

Alan Stewart's intent and the sole question before the Court

21

would be whether Walter, whether Walter has alleged and

22

supported facts sufficient for the Court to find that Stewart's

23

acts had acted with the intent to harm or in a manner which

24

Stewart should have known would result in harmful contact with

It was only after that Alan Stewart lied

So, the alleged consent should

25 I Walter.
16

1
2

THE COURT: What about the statute of limitations
argument on the battery claim?

3

MS. MCCONKIE:

In terms of the battery claim, your

4

Honor, I don't know if we actually - I believe, your Honor,

5

that we claimed that this was a civil intentional tort so there

6

was not a problem with the statute of limitations.

7
8

THE COURT:

The defendant alleges that it's a one

year statute of limitations in his memorandum.

9

MS. MCCONKIE:

Well, we claim that, we claimed it as

10

an intent civil, that it was an intentional (inaudible), that's

11

what we, that was our response at that time.

12

In terms of the fiduciary duty, paragraph 18 of the

13

complaint alleges that Alan Stewart used his position of

14

authority and influence and power as a lawyer to sexually

15

pursue, harass, to dominate, abuse and take advantage of

16

Walter.

17

compromised her legal interest in that he obtained confidential

18

information from Walter regarding her mental and emotional

19

status through his capacity as her trusted legal advisor and he

20

used this information in breach of his fiduciary duty to

21

satisfy himself.

22

as her lawyer to damage her.

23

The idea here, your Honor, is that Alan Stewart

So he used the information that he received

With respect to the fraud claim, the purposes of, one

24

of the purposes of Walter's affidavit are to present evidence

25

that; one, she acted reasonably in relying on the
17

1

representations of Alan Stewart; and two, that she suffered

2

damages. And with regard to the issue of reliance, both the

3

Court of Appeals and the Utah Supreme Court have recognized the

4

principle that a plaintiff may justifiably rely on positive

5

assertions of fact without independent investigation.

6

THE COURT:

Well, I donft think that's an issue. I

7

think you're probably on solid ground on the reliance issues.

8

The damage issue is where you have a little more work to do.

9
10

MS. MCCONKIE:

of the statute of frauds, I would like to say that we -

11
12

In terms of the fraud issue - in terms

THE COURT:

No.

You're in good shape on that

argument, too.

13

MS. MCCONKIE:

14

THE COURT:

Okay.

There wasn't a promise to marry as far as

15

I can tell in anybody's allegations so I don't think the

16

statute of fraud applies.

17
18

MS. MCCONKIE:

I thought I'd just mention it in case

the Court wanted (inaudible).

19

THE COURT: Yeah.

20

MS. MCCONKIE:

Also, your Honor, we believe that she

21

has a separate claim for breach of contract and this is also an

22

action under the theory of legal malpractice.

23

retainer agreement with him.

24

intended to, if he still remained her lawyer during this period

She signed a

There is disputed facts on if he

25 I of time.
18

1

THE COURT:

That's not in your amended complaint

2

though.

The amended complaint is battery, intentional

3

infliction of emotional distress -

4

MS. MCCONKIE: And fiduciary duty.

5

THE COURT:

6

That's where -

- negligence and breach of fiduciary

duty.

7

MS. MCCONKIE:

8

THE COURT: And there is no question but that he had

9

a fiduciary duty

10

MS. MCCONKIE:

11

THE COURT:

12

(Inaudible) that's right, your Honor.

- the question is whether or not there is

a breach.

13
14

That's right.

MS. MCCONKIE:

That's right. We went ahead and

included it because it had been argued.

15

Your Honor, it's not the purpose of a summary

16

judgment procedure to judge the credibility of the averments

17

of parties or witnesses.

18

THE COURT:

Yes, it is. When one party makes a

19

properly supported motion for summary judgment, the other party

20

has the obligation to come forward with factual information

21

indicating that there's a legal basis for the claim.

22

absolute requirement in the response for a summary judgment

23

motion.

24
25

MS. MCCONKIE:

That's correct, your Honor.

That's an

What I'm

doing is I'm quoting from Kilpatrick, the court in Kilpatrick
19

1

which talks about the fact for the weigh of evidence:

2

"Neither is it to deny parties the right to

3

a trial to resolve disputed issues of

4

fact."

5

We know here that there are disputed issues of fact.

6

It's purpose to eliminate the time, trouble and expense of

7

trial where upon new changes of the facts certify the party

8

ruled against he would not be entitled to prevail.

9

Now, your Honor, we have a situation here where

10

opposing counsel and where Mr. Stewart has claimed that there

11

was no intent to harm.

12

situation where we have a requisite actor and that intent to

13

harm can be inferred from those actions. We have met the three

14

elements of battery.

15

intending to cause harmful or offensive contact or eminent or

16

apprehension of such contact. We know he did that and we know

17

he had to lie to do that. And we also know that it put the

18

plaintiff in eminent apprehension of harm and we know, and she

19

has claimed that she has suffered serious harm.

20

is factual in nature as is the question of consent.

21

the requisite answer, requisite actor and then we need to look

22

to his intent inferred from his actions.

23

That's a factual issue. We have a

We have a defendant who intend -

Intent to harm
We have

In terms of the causation factor, causation is a

24

factual question as well.

We allege that Stewart's conduct was

25

a direct and proximate cause of injuries and that she suffered
20

enormous psychic pain when she'd been incapacitated emotionally
and she has had to medical care because of that-

And the Court

needs to assume those allegations must be true and that's she
met the threshold for the requirement of proving causation
sufficient to overcome Stewart's notions.
If we look at the Kilpatrick case, it talks
particularly about causation.

It says causation is a highly

fact sensitive element in any cause of action.

In Utah a

proximate causation is that cause which in natural and
continuous sequence unbroken by sufficient intervening cause
produces injury.

We have an attorney/client relationship. We

have a breach of duty, of fiduciary duty, and we know that he
breached his duty because we have an ethical standard which
talks about not having a sexual relationship which is also
discussed in brief in our brief and we have proximate cause for
injury.
One thing I think is really important that the Court
remember is that no where in Mr. Stewart's affidavits or no
where have they alleged that he filed a withdrawal of counsel.
And he's continued to work on whatever cases she had as they
went along.
We also want to make it very clear that we dispute
the facts that he ever withdrew and that the relationship, when
the relationship started.

I think that is central to this

issue.
21

1

Your Honor, we have an individual who had a duty, a

2

duty as an attorney who had personal information about his

3

client and he used that personal information and lied to that

4

client to receive a personal benefit and certainly if he did

5

not know, he should have known that that behavior would cause

6

her harm.

7

THE COURT: Alright, Mr. Skeen?

8

MR. SKEEN:

9

Thank you, your Honor, just briefly.

As

the Court indicated once we filed a motion for summary judgment

10

each and every element must be rebutted by competent evidence.

11

The affidavits submitted are clearly lacking.

12

any facts out there, counsel only eluded to three facts.

13

Number one, when was the divorce entered?

14

was it in April?

15

April.

16

their own allegations - well, let me move to the next one.

17

The next one is when did the relationship start?

With regard to

Was it in February,

It doesn't make any difference.

It was in

We don't, I mean that's not a fact in dispute and by

18

Paragraph 37 indicates that the first kiss was June 5th.

19

Clearly two months after entry of the divorce decree. And the

20

first sexual relationship beyond that in paragraph 40 of her

21

affidavit occurred on July 22nd. No dispute again there. We

22

indicated that, I mean we'll go with their facts because I

23

don' t believe they create any question of fact of which would

24

defer entry of summary judgment.

25

And the third fact was plaintiff says, well, who
22

1

terminated it?

2

Again, it doesn't matter.

3

certain date it was terminated and there just aren't any

4

questions of fact that are going to preclude entry of summary

5

judgment. As the Court indicated, the law is clear.

6

statute of limitations, unintentional torts is one year and

7

pursuant to our affidavits which have not been contradicted as

8

far as dates, those claims, those intentional torts claims must

9

go by virtue of the statute of limitations.

10

Did she terminate it?

Did he terminate it?

Everybody agrees that as of a

The

With respect to the breach of fiduciary duty,

11

plaintiff has indicated that somehow Mr. Stewart compromised

12

her legal status but, again, I don't see that.

13

harm.

14

follow.

15

There's no

There's no damages. And we've got to have damages

THE COURT:

I don't see a breach in the fiduciary

16

standard, meaning monetary.

17

though and it does appear that he abused the position of trust

18

to enter into an extra marital relationship that wouldn't have

19

occurred if he hadn't lied to her about her marital status

20

using the facts as they've alleged.

21

MR. SKEEN:

He was in a position of trust

Well, if - again, your Honor, I don't

22

know that the two are interconnected.

I know the Court may be

23

seeing it differently at this stage and I'll accept that but I

24

don't see that his fiduciary relationship as her legal counsel

25

somehow makes it intertwined that 23

1

THE COURT: No -

2

MR, SKEEN:

Hefs somehow got to breach that

3

relationship which leads to the sexual relationship and I don't

4

see that. He didn't breach any fiduciary, legal fiduciary

5

relationship.

6

THE COURT:

What I'm talking about with the position

7

of trust I think has to go back to the battery claims, not the

8

fiduciary duty claims.

9

MR. SKEEN:

10

No.

Sure, yeah. Okay.

And, finally, with respect to the intentional

11

infliction, again there's - the Sherman case is very clear.

12

Very recent.

13

Similar facts, and if you want to get a breach of fiduciary

14

duty, there is a patient/doctor relationship and the Court said

15

unless you can raise this level and show us that something

16

gravely different from what normally follows in a broken

17

relationship then we're not going to grant relief.

18

case she went farther than saying, hey, I had to go to a

19

shrink.

She says this broke up my marriage.

20

shrink.

I had transference of the relationship.

21

any of that here.

22

that the motion for summary not be granted.

23
24
25

Three months old. A Utah Supreme Court case.

I went to a
We don't have

So, based upon that, your Honor, I believe

THE COURT:
advisement.

And in that

Thank you.

Thank you. The matter is under

I'll get you a decision as soon as I can.

(Whereupon the hearing was concluded)

(C)
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